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CHANGES in Urban 
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This article compares the proximate but not parallel 
trajectories of Canterbury Regional Council’s (ECan) and the 
Christchurch City Council’s changing authority to manage 
the urban and natural environment from 2010 to 2015. We 
ask why the trajectories are so far from parallel, and speculate 
as to why the central government interventions were so 
different. The apparent mismatch between the justifications 
for the interventions and the interventions themselves reveals 
important implications on the national and local levels. 
Nationally, the mismatch speaks to the current debate over an 
overhaul of the Resource Management Act. Locally, it informs 
current discussions in Wellington, Nelson, Gisborne and 
elsewhere about amalgamating district and regional councils.
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Background
Between 2010 and 2012, Canterbury 
Regional Council and the Christchurch 
City Council faced governance crises. 
The former was accused by Canterbury’s 
Mayoral Forum of failing to produce a 
plan for resource use and of processing 
resource consents slowly. The latter 
experienced an 18-month spate of 
earthquakes that left 80% of the buildings 
in the central business district on the to-
be-demolished list. In the February 2011 
quake there were also 42 deaths in city 
streets, and 133 deaths in city inspected 
buildings.
In one case the government intervened 
by suspending local elections indefinitely, 
replacing the councillors, suspending 
some jurisdiction of the Environment 
Court and parts of national legislation 
in Canterbury, and changing rules for 
water conservation and use. In the other 
case, local elections and council remained 
intact, while emergency powers were 
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granted to a new government department 
for five years.
One might expect the more drastic 
and long-lived central government 
intervention in response to the more 
drastic crisis. Canterbury defies such 
expectation. Though the justification for 
intervention appeared stronger in the 
earthquake, the less life-and-death crisis 
received the more drastic intervention. 
We explore this difference. We find 
that government interventions go well 
beyond who is at the top. The method 
of choosing who is at the top (local 
elections or government appointment) is 
but a small part of the changes in natural 
resource rules in Canterbury. We propose 
that there might be broader motives, 
with national implications, for the 
changes in Canterbury governance, and 
for the differences observed. Those other 
motives might be as simple as facilitating 
irrigation approvals, or as far-reaching as 
using Canterbury as a testing ground for 
national changes to environmental laws. 
Christchurch and Canterbury before 2010
Under normal circumstances in New 
Zealand the authority to manage water, 
soil, geothermal resources, natural 
hazards, pollution, costal management, 
land use, subdivision and hazardous 
substances is devolved and delegated to 
district and regional councils by way of the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). 
Those district and regional councils 
enjoy reasonable autonomy, with flexible 
direction from central government.
The Resource Management Act aims 
to ‘promote the sustainable management 
of natural and physical resources’ (section 
5). The RMA’s governance structure 
allows the government to provide central 
guidance to district and regional councils 
in the form of national policy statements 
(NPS) on resources such as freshwater, 
biodiversity and the like. Regional 
councils then use the NPS to establish 
regional goals (in a regional policy 
statement); then district councils work 
within and implement both the national 
and regional policy statements. This 
planning hierarchy establishes a system 
in which local authorities make decisions 
within central guidelines.
However, these national policy 
statements have been slow to arrive (see 
Figure 1). Thus, for freshwater and other 
resources the RMA planning hierarchy 
has had little at the top (Oram, 2007; 
Memon and Gleeson, 1995). This lack of 
central direction has led local and regional 
authorities to facilitate strategic land use 
policy through the Local Government 
Act 2002, as it offers broader strategic 
tools than the RMA (Swaffield, 2012). 
Examples of this include the current 
Greater Christchurch Urban Development 
Strategy, and Christchurch’s 2006 Central 
City Revitalisation Strategy. They are 
strategic attempts to create planning 
certainty within Christchurch through 
the direct intervention of a territorial 
authority. 
Perhaps more concerning, this lack of 
central planning guidance unintentionally 
reverses the intended hierarchy of the 
RMA. Rather than planning within 
the intended hierarchy, communities 
are instead forced through a bottom-
up approach of case-by-case decision-
making with its attendant inefficiencies 
and inequities (Brower, 2008, pp.57-8).
Between 2010 and 2012 both ECan 
and the Christchurch City Council faced 
governance crises deemed to be so pressing 
that the central government intervened. 
Thus, ‘normal circumstances’ described 
above started to change in April 2010 with 
the passage of the Environment Canterbury 
(Temporary Commissioners and Improved 
Water Management) Act 2010 (ECan Act). 
They changed again in September 2010 and 
March 2011 with passage of the first and 
second earthquake acts.
Environment Canterbury
Let us start with the regional council, 
Environment Canterbury or ECan. 
Section 30 of the RMA authorises Ecan, 
like all regional governments, to manage 
the water, air and coastal resources of 
the region. The ECan Act replaced the 
ECan councillors with government-
appointed commissioners, suspended 
regional elections, suspended jurisdiction 
of the Environment Court over certain 
types of decisions, allowed the minister 
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to selectively suspend sections of 
environmental law, and changed the rules 
for river protection (Brower, 2010). The 
statute set an expiry date, of 2013. In 2013 
Parliament amended the act to extend 
the expiry date to 2016 (Public Act 2013 
No. 6). In 2015 Cabinet proposed another 
amendment, not an expiration. None 
of this applied to other regions; neither 
was it quake-induced; nor did it happen 
overnight. 
In 2009 the government commissioned 
a review of the RMA which suggested 
abolishing regional councils altogether 
(Gorman, 2009b). Amy Adams, now 
minister of justice, reminded then (and 
now) minister for the environment Nick 
Smith that the government held the power 
to sack poorly performing regional and 
district councils, with solid evidence of 
that poor performance (ibid.). Smith then 
threatened to use these powers if ECan 
failed to speed up consents-processing. 
Governments had sacked councils before, 
without special legislation (Staff, 2000, 
2001). The communications officer of 
the Department of Internal Affairs, Tony 
Wallace, further reminded the public that 
the government could replace the council 
only in cases of ‘significant and identifiable 
mismanagement of the resources of the 
local authority, or [inability] to perform 
and exercise its duties’ (Gorman, 2009b). 
Later in 2009 the Canterbury Mayoral 
Forum wrote to Smith asking for central 
government intervention in ECan. The 
government inquiry, led by former 
National deputy prime minister Wyatt 
Creech (Gorman, 2009e), suggested ‘a 
new regional authority to handle all water 
issues’, echoing the government’s review 
of the RMA eight months earlier (Staff, 
2010). It argued that ECan had suffered 
from the ‘gold rush’ effect of the ‘first 
come, first served’ case-by-case decision-
making for water rights, which slowed 
consent processing. Creech (Creech at 
al., 2010) found no current and ongoing 
substance to the mayors’ criticism, instead 
expressing optimism that systems had 
been sufficiently amended to allow for 
adequate consent processing.
Creech was most concerned by the 
council’s ability or otherwise to create 
effective regional policy. At the time, ECan 
was in the midst of both reviewing its 
regional policy statement and creating its 
natural resources regional plan.1 Different 
teams were working on the different 
plans, creating potential for conflict. 
Creech argued that this highlighted 
ECan’s inability to create definitive and 
durable regional policy.
Many have said that the Creech report 
prompted the ECan Act. But Smith did 
not need special legislation to replace 
ECan councillors with commissioners; 
his government held the power. There 
are several reasons the government 
might have gone to the trouble of special 
legislation to create powers it already 
had. Perhaps it: 1) was not confident that 
ECan had breached legislative thresholds; 
or 2) had other goals. Understanding the 
rest of the ECan Act sheds light on the 
possibility of those other goals.
Section 31 of the ECan Act gives 
the minister for the environment the 
power to decide where and when 
environmental law applies in Canterbury. 
The ‘transitional regulations’ of section 
31 give the minister the power to specify 
that certain sections of the RMA ‘do not 
apply, despite being applied under this 
Act; or do apply, despite not applying 
under this Act’ (section 31(b)(i)(A, B)). 
Constitutional law scholars call section 
31 a ‘Henry VIII clause’, because it creates 
the authority to dis-apply the empowering 
legislation (the RMA) selectively and 
at will without recourse to Parliament 
(Geddis, in Gorman, 2010). This is akin 
to selectively beheading inconvenient 
sections of the RMA, as dear old Henry 
beheaded inconvenient wives. 
Section 31 gives supremacy to 
subordinate legislation (ECan Act) over 
primary legislation (RMA). It also allows 
Parliament to abdicate its authority, 
by delegating to the political executive 
(minister for the environment) the 
power ‘to make regulations suspending, 
amending, or overriding primary 
legislation’ (Joseph, 2007, p.503). New 
Zealand constitutional law scholar 
Philip Joseph calls this type of clause 
‘constitutionally objectionable where they 
are used for general legislative purposes’ 
(Joseph, 2010, p.195).
Section 52 then restricts Cantabrians’ 
access to the Environment Court. Under 
the ECan Act, Cantabrians can no 
longer appeal the substance of regional 
government decisions about water 
conservation orders (WCOs) and the 
regional plan and policy statements. While 
all other of the ECan Act’s provisions were 
meant to expire at the next election, even 
with its flexible date and form, section 
46(4) excludes the Environment Court 
from Canterbury water conservation 
order proceedings. Section 46(4(a)) 
directs that the revocation of appeals to 
the Environment Court on WCOs will 
continue to apply even after the next 
election (Brower, 2010). This removes 
the court’s ‘sober second look’ (Waldron, 
2008) at the substance of environmental 
decisions, and risks compromising the 
quality of decision-making under the 
RMA in Canterbury. In the end section 
46(4) mattered little, as the non-electoral 
provisions are set to outlast the electoral 
provisions.
Section 46 also changed the rules 
for new WCO applications.2 In all 
other regions of New Zealand regional 
councils must prioritise protection of a 
river’s nationally outstanding ecological, 
recreational, cultural, or wild and scenic 
A resource management lawyer acting 
for the Fish and Game councils of  
New Zealand commented on Radio  
New Zealand: ‘it’s still a possibility that 
those iconic rivers will remain protected, 
but I wouldn’t bet … on it’
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characteristics before allowing resource 
use, unless the economic potential was 
important on a national scale.3 The 
ECan Act changed the order, so that 
conservation loses its priority status. In 
other words, it took the conservation out 
of water conservation orders. But again, 
this was only in Canterbury. A resource 
management lawyer acting for the Fish 
and Game councils of New Zealand 
commented on Radio New Zealand: ‘it’s 
still a possibility that those iconic rivers 
will remain protected, but I wouldn’t bet 
… on it’ (Baker, quoted in Pettie, 2010).
The Environment Court appeal on 
the Hurunui River water conservation 
order was scheduled to begin on 30 May 
2010. Parliament passed the ECan Act 
under urgency in April and changed the 
rules at half-time on the Hurunui. Jurists 
view shifting the goalposts at half-time as 
constitutionally objectionable because it 
violates the principle of equal application 
of the law (Joseph, 2007, p.212).4 In 
other words, the non-electoral provisions 
of the ECan Act – the authority granted 
in section 31 to selectively not apply 
the RMA, the supremacy of subordinate 
regional legislation, the partially suspended 
jurisdiction of the Environment Court, 
and half-time changes to river protection 
rules – change the shape of regional 
democracy in Canterbury more than 
suspending elections did. 
On 18 March 2015 Nick Smith released 
a discussion document proposing a plan 
for the future of ECan, and invited public 
submissions. The proposal is to impose 
a mixed-governance model, with seven 
elected councillors (in 2016) and six 
appointed commissioners. Smith said this 
model for Ecan
enables a majority of elected 
representatives while ensuring 
continued momentum on the 
Canterbury Water Management 
Strategy and earthquake recovery 
work. We considered other options 
of a fully elected council and 
alternatives that involved substantive 
changes to council functions. Our 
preliminary view is that these carry 
too many risks given the critical 
stage of work on the Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy and the 
earthquake recovery. (Pearson, 2015a)
On 22 June 2015 Cabinet considered 
and affirmed the proposal (Staff, 2015).
Under the new structure ECan would 
still enjoy the extra powers, the non-
electoral provisions described above. The 
report also hints, rather openly, that the 
soon-to-be-released reforms to the RMA 
will spread Canterbury’s special powers, 
and perhaps its mixed-governance model, 
around the country. The report states:
Since the review provisions in the 
ECan Act came into force, reforms 
have been proposed to the RMA, 
which if enacted, would make 
planning and consenting functions 
more efficient and effective and 
will remove the need for the new 
governing body to have special 
power. However, a transitional 
arrangement could be put in place 
for [Canterbury’s] new governing 
body in 2016, to extend the special 
powers. This could ensure that 
there is no period in which there is 
a need for a return to the standard 
resource management arrangements 
before the RMA reforms are 
implemented. To return to standard 
RMA arrangements for just a short 
period may be an inefficient use of 
resources and a source of confusion 
for Canterbury communities 
and other users of the resource 
management system. (Ministry for 
the Environment, 2015, p.22)
Whether this statement foreshadows 
the future of the RMA remains to be 
seen. If it does portend the contents 
of already-signalled changes to the 
RMA, then we might see the rest of 
New Zealand following the Canterbury 
model, with its bottom-up collaborative 
approach to water management in the 
Canterbury water management strategy 
and its top-down directive approach to 
representation in its mixed-governance 
model. If this comes to pass it would 
be legislation by synecdoche. Deborah 
Stone describes synecdoche, a type of 
symbolism that represents the whole by 
one of its parts, as common in politics: 
Politicians or interest groups 
deliberately choose one egregious 
or outlandish incident [such as 
Canterbury water] to represent 
the universe of cases, and then use 
that example to build support for 
changing an entire rule or policy that 
is addressed to the larger universe [of 
natural resource management in all 
of New Zealand]. … As with other 
forms of symbolic representation, 
the synecdoche can suspend our 
critical thinking. … The strategy of 
focusing on a part of a problem … 
is likely to lead to skewed policy. Yet 
it is often a politically useful strategy 
… because it can make a problem 
concrete, allow people to identify 
with someone else, and mobilize 
anger. Also it reduces the scope of the 
problem and thereby makes it more 
manageable. (Stone, 2002, pp.146-8)
In its resemblance to a cart leading its 
horse, legislating by synecdoche turns the 
Given the government’s keen attention 
to leading the ECan cart to remediate 
apparent regional policy failures, one 
would expect similarly enthusiastic 
attention to the local Christchurch 
City Council’s troubles following the 
earthquakes of 2010–2011
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RMA’s intended planning hierarchy on its 
head. Further, it gives policy supremacy 
to a subsidiary region.
Christchurch City Council
Given the government’s keen attention to 
leading the ECan cart to remediate apparent 
regional policy failures, one would expect 
similarly enthusiastic attention to the 
local Christchurch City Council’s troubles 
following the earthquakes of 2010-2011. 
The government faced many of the 
same issues with the Christchurch City 
Council as it had with ECan – after the 
September 2010 quake, after the February 
2011 quake, and in the building consents 
crisis of 2013. In each of these cases the 
government created special powers for 
the city and district councils, by way of 
orders in council (Canterbury Earthquake 
Response Recovery Act 2010), and later for 
itself (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority Act 2011). But it never sacked 
the councillors themselves, even though 
in January 2012 one councillor called 
for the Christchurch City Council to be 
disbanded (Gorman and Sachdeva, 2012). 
CERA – the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority – is due to last only 
five years and the building consents 
commissioner stayed just one year, 
compared to ECan’s six and counting.
In contrast to the electoral changes 
introduced by the ECan Act, which had 
legal foundations in active statute and 
precedent, the special powers during a 
prolonged disaster recovery were not 
foreshadowed by the Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Act. Hence 
Parliament needed to create them by 
legislation (Brookie, 2012, p.20; Rotimi, 
2010, pp.18-20), just as it needed 
legislation to enact the non-electoral 
provisions of the ECan Act described 
above.
Between 4 September 2010 and  
22 February 2011
When the ten-day state of emergency 
after the 4 September 2010 earthquake 
ended, Parliament passed the Canterbury 
Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 
2010 (CERR Act, or first earthquake 
act) under urgency. Section 6 allows the 
executive to administer quick orders in 
council that ‘may make exceptions from, 
modify or extend the provisions of any 
New Zealand statute’. 
The orders in council tool in section 
3(c) allowed for as-needed and on-demand 
legislative changes to speed recovery or 
enhance public safety in the streets of 
Christchurch, without consultation with 
Parliament. These exceptions to laws on 
the books were not limited to public 
safety or securing the essentials of life, 
as one might expect in an extended state 
of emergency. Indeed, critics warned that 
the expansive powers were vulnerable 
to abuse (Geddis et al., 2010), and that 
they granted ministers the ‘unfettered 
right to legislate by decree’ (Public Issues 
Committee of the Auckland District Law 
Society, 2010). Echoing constitutional 
concerns over the ECan Act six months 
earlier, the Auckland District Law Society 
said: ‘for Parliament to transfer such 
extensive powers to the Crown, and 
thereby abdicate its own responsibility on 
behalf of the people, is constitutionally 
very questionable’ (ibid.). The only 
constitutional law academic who signed 
the letter objecting to the constitutional 
‘repugnance’ of the ECan Act, but did 
not sign Andrew Geddis’s open letter of 
concern about the first earthquake act, 
was University of Canterbury professor 
Philip Joseph (Geddis et al., 2010). 
To Joseph, the circumstances of the 
latter were sufficiently different to and 
more grave than the former that it was 
more appropriate to invoke the flexible 
nature of New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements in crafting an effective and 
equitable response.
Before the CERR Act, Christchurch 
City Council was bound by the RMA to 
follow procedures and consent processes 
for demolishing, constructing or altering 
buildings. Under CERR Act authority, 
the Crown issued 14 orders in council 
amending or repealing existing legislation 
and regulations, in fields as diverse as 
resource management, civil defence, 
historic places and local government. 
The city council used the special powers 
granted by orders in council to demolish 
buildings threatening public safety only 
three times.5 Many judged the council 
harshly for this (Heather, 2012).
After 22 February 2011
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Act 2011 (the CERA Act, or second 
earthquake act) created many of the same 
special powers that the first earthquake 
act had. But this time Parliament gave the 
powers to a new government department 
– CERA – and instructed councils to act 
‘as directed’. Further, the CERA Act gave 
CERA the power to: amend or revoke 
RMA documents and city plans; close 
or otherwise restrict access to roads 
and other geographical areas; demolish 
buildings; otherwise enter and manage 
risk on private land and property (with 
notice in the case of marae and dwellings); 
and require compliance of any person 
with a direction made under the act 
(Buddle Findlay, 2011). The Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Act expires in April 
2016, though some of the special powers 
created by it might persist, according to 
the minister for earthquake recovery (New 
Zealand Government, 2014).
The building consents crisis of 2013 
In the wake of the series of earthquakes 
that left 80% of the buildings in the 
Christchurch CBD on the to-be-
In the wake of the series of earthquakes 
that left 80% of the buildings in 
the Christchurch CBD on the to-be-
demolished list, the Christchurch City 
Council faced a predictable flood of 
building consent applications.
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demolished list, the Christchurch City 
Council faced a predictable flood of 
building consent applications. In February 
2012 the council announced that it had 
hired 69 new full-time staff to process 
consents (Christchurch City Council, 
2012). By 1 July 2013 those extra staff were 
not enough. International Accreditation 
New Zealand revoked the council’s 
accreditation, and the prime minister 
held a press conference announcing that 
he was revoking the council’s authority 
to issue building consents. Revoking a 
council’s authority was ‘unprecedented’, 
Key said, but, rather than take unilateral 
action through an act of Parliament, he, 
several ministers and officials would meet 
with the Christchurch City Council to put 
‘options on the table and seek … council 
agreement with a proposed course of 
action’ (Key, quoted in Cairns and Young, 
2014). Within a fortnight the government 
had appointed a Crown manager to 
oversee the building consents department 
for one year, and the Christchurch City 
chief executive, Tony Maryatt, had been 
put on ‘gardening leave’ indefinitely 
(Bayer, 2013). 
To some commentators’ mild surprise, 
the elected councillors and their mayor 
kept their jobs throughout (McCrone, 
2015). 
Discussion
It is timely and instructive to compare 
the trajectories of Christchurch and 
Canterbury. It is particularly so as 
Christchurch looks to a post-CERA city, 
Canterbury looks to partial regional 
elections, the government looks set to 
reform the RMA, and discussions around 
amalgamation continue in Wellington 
and elsewhere. 
In Christchurch the government 
faced, and still faces, an unprecedented 
challenge. Most expected government 
intervention. Environment Canterbury 
faced challenges with plenty of precedent, 
and well-known roots in the national 
context. The government had several 
policy options for ECan, each fairly well-
trodden paths. It could have followed 
RMA procedure – adopting national 
policy statement guidance. A slightly 
less well-trodden path was replacing 
elected councillors with appointed 
commissioners. It is well within the 
government’s power to do so, if the 
council has documented deficiencies. Yet 
the government created its own path for 
ECan, passing special legislation under 
urgency. 
Perhaps among the government’s 
primary goals were the non-electoral 
provisions of the ECan Act, which changed 
water conservation orders and affected 
applicability of both the Environment 
Court and sections of the RMA. The 
minister of agriculture at the time, David 
Carter, said as much in a 2010 speech to 
Irrigation New Zealand: 
I would have thought what 
happened recently with Environment 
Canterbury would be a signal to all 
regional councils to work a bit more 
constructively with their farmer 
stakeholders …We had to act here 
in Canterbury because the situation 
was untenable if we are going to 
seriously make progress in delivering 
this irrigation. (Carter, quoted in 
Williams, 2010)
Although 2016 will see partial regional 
elections return to Canterbury, the non-
electoral provisions will remain. 
A few months after the ECan Act was 
passed, the government created special 
emergency powers for Christchurch City 
Council, which used them sparingly after 
the major quakes of 4 September and 26 
December 2011 (Heather, 2012). After the 
22 February 2011 quake the government 
handed those same special powers, and 
more, to a new government department, 
which used them less sparingly. Then the 
government revoked consenting authority 
and replaced a council department for 
a year in the building consents crisis of 
2013.
While the legislative framework 
surrounding the Christchurch earthquake 
response is set to expire in April 2016, 
the ECan anomaly is set to endure. 
According to our reading, the Ministry 
for the Environment’s proposal for mixed 
governance seems to imply that the new 
ECan model will act as a transitional 
phase, until the proposed RMA reforms 
spread the non-electoral provisions of 
the ECan Act to the rest of the country. 
However, the changed numbers in 
Parliament following the 2015 Northland 
by-election might render the government 
unable to pass its preferred changes. 
Conclusion
We are not arguing that any of these 
actions were frivolous or unnecessary. 
We note with interest the apparent over-
legislation for ECan and under-legislation 
for Christchurch City Council. There 
is a discrepancy between well-trodden 
actions the government could have taken 
in replacing elected councils, and the 
actions the government took for ECan 
instead. This discrepancy suggests that in 
amalgamation talks, territorial authorities 
would be wise to be careful what they 
wish for. 
The Canterbury comparison has 
broader implications for national 
environmental law and legislative 
style. The government’s 2015 proposed 
amendment to ECan governance hints 
that many of the non-electoral provisions 
of the ECan Act will be echoed in RMA 
amendments foreshadowed for 2015. 
Allowing the Canterbury case study 
to guide national legislation looks like 
legislating by synecdoche. This echoes 
constitutional scholars’ criticism of the 
Henry VIII clause, section 32, of the 
ECan Act. Legislating by synecdoche 
gives supremacy to a subordinate regional 
governance model. In other words, it 
would be the national horse leading the 
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Allowing the Canterbury case study 
to guide national legislation looks like 
legislating by synecdoche.
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regional cart from 2010-2015, until the 
regional cart is able to reform the entire 
national horse. The former is well within 
the RMA governance model; the latter is 
less so.
1 The NRRP was ‘stuck’ in its schedule 1 phase, therefore 
still in development and not notified yet. The worry was 
that when it was notified, it would clash with the regional 
policy statement. Option 1 of the Creech report suggests the 
creation of the Canterbury Regional Water Authority, which 
would create the plan (and the report details how the plan 
should work), and integrate with the ‘remaining sections of 
the NRRP’ (Creech et al., 2010, p.16).
2 Section 199 of the RMA defines WCOs as follows: ‘the 
purpose of a water conservation order is to recognise and 
sustain –
(a) outstanding amenity or intrinsic values which are afforded 
by waters in their natural state;
(b) where waters are no longer in their natural state, the 
amenity or intrinsic values of those waters which 
in themselves warrant protection because they are 
considered outstanding.
(2) A water conservation order may provide for any of the 
following:
(a) the preservation as far as possible in its natural 
state of any water body that is considered to be 
outstanding;
(b) the protection of characteristics which any water body 
has or contributes to, and which are considered to 
be outstanding, –
(i) as a habitat for terrestrial or aquatic organisms;
(ii) as a fishery;
(iii) for its wild, scenic, or other natural 
characteristics;
(iv) for scientific and ecological values;
(v) for recreational, historical, spiritual, or cultural 
purposes;
(c) the protection of characteristics which any water body 
has or contributes to, and which are considered to 
be of outstanding significance in accordance with 
tikanga Maori.’
3 The priority for protection arises from the requirement 
that ‘particular regard’ be given to section 199, and then 
that only ‘regard’ be given to the matters listed in section 
207(a)–(c).
4 Citing Thomas J in R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 at 
712-713.
5 Christchurch City Council testimony at royal commission 
hearings.
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